Abstract-A key feature of open systems is the expectation of non-compliant behaviour, which may be due to accident, necessity, or malice. Therefore, a system requirement for sustainable operation is to deal with non-compliance through error detection and correction according to type and severity. This paper presents a formal model of a self-organising system of 'retributive justice' that encapsulates monitoring, enforcement, and conflict-resolution. Multi-agent simulation is used to evaluate the performance of this system, whereby agents play a variant of the linear public good game and use a behaviour observation framework to adapt their decision-making. Experimental results show that although self-organisation of retributive justice alone cannot guarantee sustainability in an open system and there seems to be no 'ideal' system, it can improve the utility of the collective and diminish the likelihood of non-compliance.
I. INTRODUCTION
A well known requirement of many open networks and distributed computing systems is the collective action of allocating computing resources amongst constituent agents. Without relying on external operator intervention, open systems instead exploit self-organisation to achieve decentralised resource management. Through cooperation and synchronisation, internal agents self-determine a set of conventional rules to govern the resource distribution process and thus meet transient conditions of the local environment more effectively.
However, under such adaptive conditions there is the possibility of sub-ideal component behaviour due to self-interested objectives that contradict and potentially impede the common goal of the system. In particular, the autonomous nature of agents sharing resources for a mutual purpose may lead to non-compliance with self-determined resource allocation rules, which could stem from either accident, necessity or malice. For instance, an agent might intentionally choose to 'cheat' by demanding more resources than it needs. The consequences of this action can subsequently affect the strategy of any observing agents depending on whether or not the agent responsible for non-compliance is appropriately sanctioned.
To compensate for any expected error, the system performs corrective action as a means for restoring a 'normative' state. This desired functionality ratifies the need to monitor agent behaviour and enforce sanction policies. Therefore, a fundamental design choice is deciding how to employ these norms over an autonomous and heterogeneous agent population, as they can play a crucial role in the sustainability of a shared resource. For example, harsh sanctioning or excessive monitoring will nail down security but may also prove to be an overly prescriptive procedure that poses a threat to the survival of the collective.
Computational justice is an inter-disciplinary field of research that addresses the challenges of establishing 'correctness' in collective adaptive systems, by interfacing formal representations of 'justice' into computer science applications [1] . Within this research domain, ideas extracted from the social sciences are applied to formalise protocols about different forms of justice. Determining a proportional arrangement of error recognition and sanctioning is an issue that coincides with notions of retributive justice, a category of justice that investigates how to punish non-compliant behaviour.
As a result, the contribution of this paper is an exploration of the various trade-offs that monitoring and sanctioning in open systems impose on the state of a common goal, using a self-organising social system of retributive justice. Resource allocation is the focal point of collective action and is situated in the context of self-enduring institutions managing a common-pool resource (CPR). We define a formal model of justice by formulating protocols of correction to regulate CPR management according to socio-economic and legal theory. Furthermore, we introduce a behaviour observation framework, SpinWorld, which enables agents to adapt their decision-making under subjection to principles of retribution. The significance of this preliminary work is the improvement in maximising compliance pervasion and overall utility, as well as suggested evidence for further research in seeking an optimally sustainable scheme of error detection and correction using a self-organising approach.
This paper is structured in the following manner. Section II reviews self-organising electronic institutions (SOEI) and details the theoretical basis behind designing methods of punishment using different disciplinary concepts. A formal model of a social system of retributive justice is developed in Section III, whilst Section IV describes an operational implementation of this model as a multi-agent testbed. Experimental results obtained from simulating this testbed are presented and evaluated in Section V, which demonstrate increased collective utility and diminished levels of non-compliance. Section VI discusses related and further work, and Section VII follows with a summary of findings and conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
This section covers the necessary background of this paper. Elinor Ostrom's theory of self-governance [2] and Artikis' computational framework [3] for specifying 'dynamic' normgoverned systems are first reviewed in order to define an SOEI. Concepts of psychology, jurisprudence, and philosophy are then examined for their relevance in modelling punishment.
A. Self-Governing the Commons
According to game-theoretic analysis, many scenarios involving a group of independent (human) actors pooling their resources will lead to an inevitable depletion of the common pool due to individual incentives taking precedence over the collective good. However, Ostrom [2] presented numerous examples of communities that avoided these outcomes through the "evolution" of self-governing institutions, which led instead to enduring CPR management. Although Ostrom's fieldwork identified successful occasions of communities collectively managing their resource pool and avoiding game-theoretic outcomes, simply forming an institution did not guarantee this outcome. For successful communities, Ostrom noticed eight features that were all present, and one or more were missing in unsuccessful cases. Consequently, when addressing the issue of "supply", eight design principles were identified to regulate and coordinate agent behaviour for enduring self-management of the commons [2, p. 90] .
Three of these principles are concerned with error detection and correction: P4 monitoring, P5 graduated sanctions, and P6 conflict resolution. The fundamental issue targeted by this paper is that if principles P2 congruence to the environment and P3 self-determination are observed, then these principles should also apply to the mechanisms and processes deployed for monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution.
B. Self-Organising Electronic Institutions (SOEI)
Artikis defined a dynamic framework for agents of a normgoverned open system to modify the rules at runtime [3] . The framework has three major components: a specification of the norm-governed system, a set of protocol levels for defining changes to this specification, and a "metric space" for expressing the "distance" between two specification instances.
Although the framework can specify a diverse range of systems, this paper is only concerned with describing a normgoverned system that conforms to principles for self-governing institutions. An SOEI is thus defined as a collection of agents plus a dynamic specification of a norm-governed system. A rule-set adhering to the theory of enduring institutions is incorporated into this specification for the purpose of realising self-* features, such as self-organisation and self-regulation. Therefore, an SOEI is essentially an electronic portrayal of Ostrom's self-governing institutions.
C. Theory of Punishment
In psychology, the diversity of institutions and people begs to question the motivation behind human desire to punish criminal action. Carlsmith and Darley addressed this topic by seeking the origin of cultural tendency for human communities to propose punishment in accordance with crime [4] . Their findings suggested that intuitions of justice in the general public are consistent with principles of retributive justice. Retributive justice is one of the many different qualifiers of 'justice', for which a wrongdoing or immoral action is punished in proportion to the moral magnitude of the crime.
Moral philosophy traditionally debates the justification in permitting a community to punish its members by distinguishing between two schools of thought: retributivism and utilitarianism. Kant [5] best captures the retributivist perspective by asserting that punishment in proportion to the severity of an offence is both just and necessary in order to maintain social control, with no pardon for future redemption of the offender. Under this notion of an offender facing retribution for what they deserve, no other principle is a legitimate ground for punishment. By contrast, Bentham [6] founded a utilitarian outlook on justice, which argued that punishment of a wrongdoer should be assessed by the overall gains and losses of utility to society. Punishment is thus deemed moral under the circumstance of society benefitting, with the loss of utility to an offender acting as a deterrent to recidivism, whilst discouraging other agents from replicating a similar violation.
Regardless of the justification chosen for sanctioning wrongdoers, there will be several practical issues to address in designing a mechanism for punishment. These issues include deciding when an action constitutes a violation, what level of severity to impose in sanctioning, and how to assign a form of punishment. For example, if an action deserves penalty, then should this breach of 'law' be punished proportionately, or does the possibility for rehabilitation mandate forgiveness? In any case, open systems have access to a broad range of scholarly concepts that can aid in modelling protocols for error monitoring and correction.
III. FORMAL MODEL
In this section, a formal model of a multi-agent system is defined using SOEI. SpinWorld is then introduced as a behaviour observation and propagation framework for informing constituent agents on their decision-making when under subjection to rules of error detection and corrective action.
A. Multi-Agent System
A generic model of a multi-agent system can be derived to tackle the challenge of resource allocation and expected error in open systems. Let this model, denoted as IC t at discrete time step t, be defined by the 4-tuple:
where:
• A is a set of mobile agents.
• I is a set of institutions.
• L is a norm-governed system specification.
• G is a set of games. Electronic institutions, I, are represented as social networks that are dynamically formed via collisions between mobile agents, as shown in Figure 1 . L is the specification space of the system and contains rules of empowerment with different degrees of freedom (DoF) [3] . These DoF are configurable parameters that specify the operational-and collective-choice rules of institutions. For example, a collective-choice rule in L with one DoF could be the resource allocation method and the possible values could be {random, ration, queue}. Lastly, G is a set of n-player games.
Each institution (or social network) i t ∈ I t is a 4-tuple:
• M is a set of members and a subset of A.
• l is a specification instance of L.
• is the local environment represented as the pair Bf , If .
• g is an n-player game. The pair Bf , If corresponds to the set of brute and institutional facts. Brute facts Bf are true by virtue of the environment's 'physical' reality and are changed by performing physical actions, such as provisioning to the common pool. Institutional facts If are instead true by virtue of 'conventional' agreement and are changed by exercising institutionalised power [7] , often (but not only) by performing speech acts.
An institution consisting of members M chooses an nplayer game g to play. Each institution encompasses the ruleset defined by L and is instantiated in l with the DoF of these rules assigned to a single value from the set of possible values. Error detection and correction rules have the following DoF:
• Monitor: Select whether to monitor or ignore noncompliance.
• Graduated Sanctioning: Select whether to sanction violations in graduated levels or not.
• Deterrence: Select whether to apply principles of deterrence in sanctioning or not.
• Conflict-Resolution: Select whether to have a conflict resolution mechanism or not. SOEI that incorporate monitoring, graduated sanctioning, and conflict-resolution abide by three of Ostrom's design principles (Principles 4, 5, and 6), which display a close link with a framework of retributive justice [2, p. 90] .
Finally, each agent a t ∈ A t participating in the system can be defined by the 5-tuple:
• R is a set of quantities for resources allocation.
• E is a set of utility and satisfaction parameters.
• H is a set of physical properties.
• swf is the SpinWorld framework.
• D is a decision function concerning compliance. Every agent has a set of physical properties H, such as their velocity and cell location. In an n-player game, agents also possess attributes R for their individual resource management. A set of utility and satisfaction values E describe the state of an agent with respect to their success in managing personal resources. This set may also include a threshold for which an agent decides to leave an institution.
Decision function, D, is applied by agents to formulate a strategy for maximising their E properties. This probabilistic function aids agents in determining whether or not to comply with game rules. In this decision-making process, a driving force is an agent's intrinsic propensity to cheat. The adaptation of this decision-making relies on the SpinWorld framework swf , which is responsible for computing a factor that either reinforces or slackens an agent's tendency for non-compliance.
B. SpinWorld Framework
SpinWorld is a framework used to express behaviour observation in agents that are subjected to norms of punishment. The framework swf is formally denoted by a 3-tuple:
• o is a set of observation update functions.
• κ is a set of observation data structures.
• μ is a set of observation metrics. Members observe institutional power of monitoring and sanctioning. These observations represent information events for the framework, where functions o react to such events by updating stored data structures κ for a particular individual. Agents use a set of metrics μ (propensity to cheat indicators) to analyse the stored information and to generate a 'spin' factor. This spin output is either a reinforcing or diminishing influence on the agent's probability to cheat.
The decision-to-cheat function, D, of a component determines the spin factor, updates the propensity to cheat property, and then probabilistically chooses a strategy of compliance. A high spin increases the likelihood of an agent cheating on their next action and vice versa for a low spin. Implementation of the D function is described in Section IV-B.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
This section describes an operational system of the formal model discussed in Section III. The Java-based Presage2 [8] platform was used to build and simulate a multi-agent environment for experimentation with this system.
The testbed developed to implement this computational system is first introduced using the linear public good (LPG) game. We then provide a description of the core behaviour and decision-making of players, followed by an executable specification of the SOEI protocols.
A. Testbed: Linear Public Good (LPG) Game
A useful mechanism for analysing the problem of individual resource contribution in a CPR is the n-player Linear Public Good (LPG) game [9] , used for testing the dilemma of voluntary contributions and free-riding.
Self-organising error detection and correction in open systems that collectively allocate resources can be studied using a variant of the LPG game, LPG [10] . In each round of the LPG game, 'players' demand and provision resources before receiving an allocated quantity. This allotted amount is then appropriated at the end of the round. An institution regulates resource pool conditions and player actions according to a mutually-agreed set of conventional rules.
We developed a testbed in Presage2 that maps an abstraction of this procedure to the core simulation loop, as detailed in Algorithm 1. The algorithm shows an institution in a single iteration of the loop, or the equivalent of a LPG game round.
A run of the testbed is initialised at time step t = 0 with a random agent population size n and an empty set of institutions I. Metrics for governing rules of institutions are configured in the parameter specifications.
At the beginning of each round, the institution's members are updated based on collisions between agents. Members play the LPG game by performing a sequence of actions with respect to a CPR. Once these actions are processed, the institution aggregates all provisions and computes the common pool before allocating resources amongst its internal agents (lines [8] [9] . A random allocator is employed, as this policy is no less 'unfair' than any other method (e.g. queue, priority).
For error recognition and correction, an institution monitors members and determines whether to sanction detected violations. Offenders may appeal against punishments.
B. Agent Players
An agent refers to the SpinWorld framework on a roundby-round basis before deciding whether to pursue a compliant or non-compliant path. A key component in this compliance decision is an agent's inherent likelihood to cheat, which is dependent on the spin factor. The formal model discussed in Section III-B weights and combines n propensity to cheat indicators to produce this spin factor. These indicators are derived from various agent observations of monitoring and sanctioning e.g. how frequently members are apprehended and how harshly they are sanctioned. This paper implements 'perceptive' indicators of risk, likelihood to be caught, and rolling benefit in pursuing a non-compliant strategy.
Consequently, the spin factor SF a,t is computed for an agent a at discrete time t as:
where m is the value of each propensity to cheat indicator μ (reinforcing values are positive and slackening values are negative) and w is its relative weight normalised to sum up to one. The SF value offers the agent a quantitative assessment of their institution's power of enforcement. update institution membership 4: for each agent a ∈ A do 5: g a ← a.generate; q a ← a.need; 6: demand d a ; provision p a ; 7: end for 8: compute common pool P = a∈A p a 9: compute random allocation R : {a|a ∈ A} → R 10: monitor agents 11: for each agent a ∈ A do 12: r a ← a.appropriate 13: update utility and satisfaction 14: end for 15: impose sanctions and manage appeals 16 :
Once SF is inferred, the following equation is applied to increase or diminish an agent's propensity to cheat:
where pch is augmented if SF is positive, indicating that the benefit of non-compliance outweighs compliance.
In the decision-to-cheat function, the updated pch property represents an agent's probability to breach governing rules. Within the function, this property is tested against the condition pch < rnd (0 , 1 ), where rnd (0 , 1 ) is a random float number between 0 and 1. If this condition returns true, a player chooses to cheat in the upcoming round, else if false they comply. Furthermore, pch is decreased by a fixed factor in the scenario where compliance has continually benefitted a player.
C. Executable Specification of Institutional Rules
JBoss Drools (https://www.jboss.org/drools) was the rule engine used to translate logical axioms of Ostrom's design principles into governing rules. The events modelled by this engine include both player actions and institutional events.
Rules are specified in the Drools rule syntax using a 'when' clause that will execute the logic described in a 'then' clause. These rules are event-driven and triggered for every newly inserted, modified, or retracted 'fact' of the system. In this way, the rule engine stores a logical framework that describes the environmental state of the system.
An example of an institution detecting a Monitored player cheating on their Demand action is illustrated in Figure 2 . This rule is signified by its name in the first line and will fire for every permutation of the combined set of facts specified in the 'when' clause. Colons bind values on the right-hand side (agent, network) to variables on the left-hand side. These variables are denoted using a $ convention ($ag, $n) and are accessed by the 'then' clause to execute a specified operation.
rule "Detect cheat on demand" when Round($t : number) MemberOf($ag : agent,$n : network) Monitored($ag,$n,$t) Generate(t == $t,$g : g,$q : q,agent == $ag) Demand(agent == $ag,t == $t,quantity > $q) then Violation v = new Violation($ag,$n,$t); end Operation of this example is as follows. The Round fact first affirms which time step the simulator is running in and MemberOf validates membership rights of the agent performing a Demand. Generated is the fact that confirms whether an agent has cheated by demanding a quantity larger than they need (quantity > $q). Finally, Monitored states that the institution caught the agent in the act of breaching this rule. Under these conditions, a Violation is declared.
Aside from error detection, corrective action events are encapsulated using sanctioning, expulsion, or appeal representations (Sanctioned, Expelled, Appealed).
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section describes an experiment that was conducted using the developed testbed of Section IV-A to assess the performance of an SOEI that facilitates error detection and corrective action. The experiment sought to explore the comparative trade-offs between varied schemes of justice on institution sustainability, utility, and agent error.
All experiment simulations involved a standard setup. T lim was set to 1000 game rounds in a 7 × 7 multi-agent environment space i.e. 49 discrete cell locations. The standard population distribution was selected as n = 40 agents, with 20 compliant and 20 non-compliant. A compliant agent's likelihood to cheat was initialised at pch = 0.025 to indicate a scenario of accidental misbehaviour, whilst a non-compliant agent had pch = 0.25 to represent malicious behaviour.
The following four schemes were tested:
• Base: Institutions exploit no mechanisms of correction.
• Principles 4|5: Institutions abide by Ostrom's Principles 4 and 5 for monitoring and graduated sanctioning.
• Principles 4|5|6: Institutions are extended to include a probabilistic dispute-resolution for agent appeals.
• Deterrence: Institutions follow a deterrent justice system by harshly sanctioning any severe offences. Parameters of these schemes were empirically determined in investigations not discussed in this paper for brevity reasons. Figure 3 shows the utility generated for each experimental run. The results demonstrate that Base generates the lowest total utility figure at around 4,300 units, whilst the other three strategies obtain improved rates for both compliant (c) and non-compliant (nc) groups. Deterrent justice rendered the best utility results, as criminal justice theory hypothesises. Figure 4 displays a bar chart for average network longevities. At the expense of utility, the Base case prevails at a level of 34.7%, which is likely due to lack of enforcing sanction policies. Notably, there is little comparative difference between retributive and deterrent institutions in this variable. Figure 5 shows the average agent propensity to cheat. The significant flaw of Base institutions appears to be their inability to deal with non-compliance. Unlike other strategies, constituent agents of Base networks quickly adapt to their environment after continuously using the SpinWorld framework. Within 50 rounds of the game, the agents have already learnt their system and fluctuate in a region of 0.39-0.48.
The other strategies display varied degrees of drops in average likelihood to cheat. P4 and P5 are alone sufficient to completely extinguish any incentive for non-compliance, with cheating rates reduced down to zero after 700 timesteps.
Experimental results conclude that there is a design choice to be made on whether the primary objective of the system should be to maximise total utility or reduce non-compliant behaviour. Establishing a system of justice to target one of these objectives is further complicated by the critical dependency on the nature of the autonomous agent population.
VI. RELATED AND FURTHER WORK
Evidence-based legislation is concerned with formulating implementations of law based on empirically derived data [11] . In a legal study, multiple controlled trials over an institution and its patterns of social behaviour may be used to derive a set of applicable rules to govern this institution, but they cannot be imposed upon another institution with a different type of social behaviour [11] . Similarly, experimentation with a social system that consists of adaptive agents is affected by volatile component behaviour (cf. [12] , [13] ). This randomness in simulations may generate varied outcomes for each repeated study, regardless of any policy's actual effectiveness.
Despite the influence of unpredictability in agent actions, Ostrom's theory of congruence (Principle 2) with the local environment and its population provides an essential means for modelling SOEI [2, p. 90 ] that can handle this adaptive nature. A more detailed approach for measuring the "fitness for purpose" [14] of an 'optimal' set of self-organising rules of justice should incorporate P2 in future investigations.
Questioning why agents choose to cheat is another integral matter that ought to be mentioned in a study of error. A recent article in behavioural ethics demonstrated that 'winning' in a competition provoked players to be more dishonest in their later actions, for reasons such as a sense of entitlement [15] . Likewise, 'losing' has been examined for its effects on victims and their sense of loss necessitating an act of selfishness or dishonesty in order to avoid further emotional or physical disadvantage [16] . By extending the SpinWorld framework to include notions of winning and losing in an n-player game, an enhanced representation of agent behaviour may be proposed.
Finally, the notion of forgiving non-compliant behaviour is another issue for future research. One method of modelling complex conflict-resolution mechanisms might use system that captures ideas of trustworthiness and forgiveness [17] . In this framework, an offender could apologise for their action and thereby regain the trust of members in the institution. By building the idea of trust and forgiveness between agents, the institution could follow a more flexible 'common sense' decision-making process for appyling sanctions.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the problem of expected component error in open multi-agent systems was addressed, where agents either intentionally or unintentionally disobey specifications of resource management. Importing concepts from legal and socio-economic theory, we have proposed a system of justice for the purpose of restoring compliance.
To investigate the various trade-offs that correction mechanisms impose on the sustainability, utility, and non-compliance of the common collective, we took a self-organising approach in developing a formal model of a multi-agent system that encapsulates Ostrom's institutional principles. Using the LPG game to model resource allocation, a testbed was designed to examine this model's performance under controlled experimentation. Results indicated that an optimal strategy for defining enduring rules to regulate SOEI is difficult to derive in a system prone to unpredictable behaviour. However, a system of retributive justice improved overall utility and significantly diminished the tendency for non-compliant behaviour.
In conclusion, this preliminary work has paved forth a means for further analysis of autonomous agent behaviour. Despite an ideal corrective action plan potentially fitting a theoretical model, implementation in practice displays limitations found in evidence-based legislation. Therefore, any future consideration of the trade-offs between schemes for error detection and correction in open systems should additionally focus on maintaining congruence with the adaptive nature of the agent population and its local environment.
